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too liberally from documents or the statute book. Every American will be eager to see a detailed and complete account of the actions of our navy, during the late war. It will exhibit a series of brilliant achievements, such as no other part of our national history presents, and we hope the author will persevere, and be successful in setting these forth under their true aspect to the public eye.

ART. II.—*Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind.* By the late THOMAS BROWN, M. D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. 4 vols. 8vo. Edinburgh, 1820. First American Edition, Andover, 1820, 3 vols. 8vo. Second American Edition, Philadelphia and Charleston, S. C. 1824, 3 vols. 8vo.

DR BROWN'S posthumous work, the title of which we have prefixed to the present article, consists of one hundred Lectures. We have already given to our readers the substance of fiftyone, in our review of a Sketch,* drawn up by the lecturer himself, for the use of those who attended his class. As this is the last time that we shall formally present him to the public, we shall subjoin to our concluding rapid analysis of his philosophical works, such notices as we have been able to obtain respecting his life and character, together with a few summary criticisms on his genius and writings.

It will be remembered, that he first arranged all the mental phenomena into two general divisions, viz. the External Affections of the mind, and its Internal Affections. The former comprehended our sensations, including our muscular feelings; the latter involved our intellectual states of mind, together with our emotions. We exhausted the analysis of the first division, and proceeded as far as through the intellectual states in the second. The Emotions remain now to be considered, before completing the author's system of the Physiology of the Mind.*

He declines venturing on a definition of Emotions, affirming that the attempt would be as truly impossible, as to define

* North American Review, No. XLIV.

sweetness, or bitterness, a sound, or a smell, in any other way, than by a statement of the circumstances in which they arise. Perhaps so ; yet, though one could not define a taste or a sound, it would be strange to philosophise upon either of them, without any reference whatever to the palate or the ear, which are their appropriated organs. Our author is liable to the charge of this delinquency, in omitting to notice what may be called the topical peculiarity of the Emotions. It must be familiar to the experience of every individual, that the seat of this class of feelings is the region of the *præcordia*. The author had already allowed the specific connexion between our intellectual states and the nerves and brain, which renders his omission on this point the more observable. He exposes himself to evident embarrassment and inconsistency throughout the work, by representing the mind as the *immediate* seat, both of the Intellectual States and Emotions. We believe that the alone true, intelligent, self active, immaterial, immortal principle lies, if we may so express ourselves, *behind* the regions of the two classes of feelings abovementioned, and communicates in some inexplicable way with both of them. There is certainly something within us, which *compares* one intellectual state with another, one emotion with another, and intellectual states with emotions. This is within the experience of all. But respecting the simple or compound nature of this interior principle, we hold all speculation to be useless.

To return to our work. The author's general principle of arranging the Emotions is their *relation to time*. They are

Immediate, or involving no notion of time whatever ;

Retrospective, or relating to the past ;

Prospective, or relating to the future.

Admiration, remorse, hope, may serve as particular instances to illustrate this distinction. We admire what is before us ; we feel remorse for some past crime ; we hope some future good.

Were they considered only as elementary feelings, without any regard to time, the emotions, he says, might be reduced to the following descriptions ; joy, grief, desire, astonishment, respect, contempt, and the two opposite species of vivid feelings, which distinguish to us the feelings, that are denominated virtuous or vicious. Such a consideration of them,

however, would be much more abstract, uninteresting, and inapplicable to human life and conduct, than the method which he has adopted.

The immediate emotions are subdivided into those, which do *not* involve any feeling that can be termed moral, and those which *do* involve some moral affection.

The following are our immediate emotions of the former kind. Cheerfulness, melancholy, wonder, mental weariness, the feeling of beauty, disgust, our feelings of sublimity and ludicrousness. To the latter subdivision may be referred the vivid feelings, that constitute to our heart what we distinguish by the names of vice and virtue, considered apart from the mere intellectual *judgments* we form respecting actions ; our emotions of love and hate ; of sympathy with the happy and with the miserable ; of pride and humility.

The retrospective emotions are subdivided as they relate to others and to ourselves. Those, which relate to others, are anger and gratitude. Those, which relate to ourselves, are, simple regret and satisfaction, without the mixture of any moral feeling ; and finally, remorse and self approbation.

The prospective emotions comprehend all our desires and all our fears. Of the former, the most important may be considered as enumerated in the following series. ‘First, our desire of continued existence, without any immediate regard to the pleasure which it may yield ; secondly, our desire of pleasure, considered directly as mere pleasure ; thirdly, our desire of action ; fourthly, our desire of society ; fifthly, our desire of power, direct, as in ambition, or indirect, as in avarice ; seventhly, our desire of the affection or esteem of those around us ; eighthly, our desire of glory ; ninthly, our desire of the happiness of others ; and, tenthly, our desire of the unhappiness of those whom we hate.’ The following paragraph on this subject, is a happy specimen of the author’s analytical skill, and of the gracefulness and facility, with which he makes the common nomenclature of our mental feelings fall into his own philosophical arrangements.

‘I must observe, however, in the first place, that each of these desires may exist in different forms, according to the degree of probability of the attainment of its object. When there is little of any probability, it constitutes what is termed a mere *wish* ; when the probability is stronger, it becomes what is called *hope* ; with

still greater probability, *expectation* ; and, with a probability that approaches certainty, *confidence*. This variation of the form of the desire, according to the degrees of probability, is, of course, not confined to any particular desire, but may run through all the desires, which I have enumerated, and every other desire of which the mind is, or may be supposed to be capable.' *Lecture 55.*

In the spirit of the foregoing paragraph, the reason why no peculiar place is set apart for the *passions* in this classification, is, that our passions are truly no separate class, but merely a name for our desires, when *very vivid*, or *very permanent*.

Dr Brown, also, goes into no separate classification of our fears, since it is evident that they are excited by precisely the same objects, which excite our desires. We *desire* to obtain any object, we *fear* that we shall not obtain it. We *dread* any pain or calamity ; we wish, we hope, that we may escape it. Thus, our fears and our desires are correlative feelings, and whatever is said of the one, may be referred, by a kind of contrasted application, to the other.

We have thus given only a rough synopsis of the author's arrangement of the emotions. He devotes to them twenty one of the hundred lectures. This portion of the book will probably be found the most popular and interesting of the whole. It is generally rich and delightful writing, with the exception of some commonplace prosing, and a little occasional declamation. The author separately considers each article in the foregoing ample catalogue, metaphysically, morally, and theologically. His speculations on this department of his science, would well bear dividing into a number of profound and elegant essays. They are adorned with a variety of apposite and beautiful illustrations, from rather a limited but very select range of reading. Perhaps the most felicitous and striking traits, in this busy picture of the emotions, are the luminous explanations of the *final causes*, for which each of them was introduced into our mental constitutions. The wisdom and goodness of the Creator are here very impressively vindicated. Even anger, hatred, and other passions, most generally liable to abuse, are shown to bear their necessary part in that harmonious arrangement, which provides for the happiness of the species. But this consideration leads the author to establish safe lines of distinction, and

to deduce from an enlightened view of our whole nature a body of excellent moral rules. To attempt even a slight sketch of the acute and profound disquisitions, the exquisite analysis, the fine sensibility, the sterling good sense, the eloquent and earnest recommendations of morality, the examination and confutation of many opinions and theories of Alison, Hutcheson, Smith, Stewart, and other philosophers, which these twentyone lectures exhibit, would be a task, agreeable indeed to ourselves, and profitable to our readers, but far too disproportioned to other purposes, for which this Journal is designed.

Among the very few topics here treated, on which we have found reason to dissent from the ingenious author, is that of Avarice. It will be seen, in his enumeration of the Desires above represented, that he regards avarice as only a modification of our desire of power. We are persuaded, that this is an inaccurate reference of the real and original principle of the emotion in question. Avarice is often exercised without regard to the attainment of any kind of power whatever. It loves money and property purely *as such*, and not for the gratifications they can purchase. Dr Brown was aware of this phenomenon, and felt its inconsistency with the above classification of the desire. He labors at great length, and quite unsuccessfully, to account for this obvious anomaly in his system. He falls into a maze of his own creating, by first ranking avarice as an indirect desire of power, and then finding that it is not always a desire of power. He wonders, through a whole lecture, why the miser should be so eager to deny himself all kinds of gratifications for the sake of that money, whose only real value is, that it can purchase, and is the representative of those very renounced gratifications! Would not our author's perplexity and inconsistency have been very easily prevented, by only adding an *eleventh* class of desires to the ten already laid down? Does not avarice flow from a distinct, original, and independent emotion, namely, a love of hoarding, or, as our author would have called it, *the desire of acquisition*? The child hoards its shells and pebbles, the virtuoso his curiosities, the collector his books, the scholar his intellectual stores, and the miser his gold, almost entirely for the gratification of this simple and separate propensity, with comparatively a faint and for-

titious influence of other motives. And to pursue a favorite train of the author's speculation, before alluded to, it is well for us that our Creator has implanted in our minds this particular desire. In *His* prospective benevolence, indeed, it was intended to be a *direct* means of acquiring power, as instrumental to our happiness. But man often fulfils this intention blindly. An inattention to the distinction here pointed out misled the author, we doubt not, into his defective classification. Were it not for the strong operation of the instinctive propensity we are suggesting, man must often have perished through want, the consequence of carelessness and improvidence. We were not left to calculate the benefits resulting from frugality, nor to wait until we should smart from privations, occasioned by lavishness and inexperience. A desire of mere acquisition, therefore, seems to be a compensation as beautiful as it is indispensable, in this fluctuating and precarious world. A too great indulgence of the feeling, of course, becomes, like an abuse of all our other desires, criminal and mischievous.

It was probably in consequence of not adverting to this indubitable law of our mental constitutions, that Dr Brown, in endeavoring to account for the unreasonable excesses of avarice, which are sometimes witnessed, was led to lay a very disproportionate stress on the *regret*, that arises from early prodigality. Indeed, he would seem at times to regard this regret, as the original foundation and main ingredient of the passion. We are constrained to question the correctness of this theory. Who has not known instances of a decided bent for avarice, which could be traced up to the earliest period after infancy, when it was impossible that the little miser could have felt any inconvenience, or regret, arising from prodigality or extravagance? Fasten down the cover of a box, perforate it for a small aperture, persuade your child to convey to it every coin that is given him, tell him to search for money on the parade ground early in the morning after each muster day, instruct him to bargain away his cake and his toys for cash, deliver to him, perpetually, short solemn lectures and cautions on the propriety of saving and hoarding his money, and such discipline, acting on the native desire for which we have been contending, will soon convert him into a sordid wretch, long before he shall have experienced

one feeling of pain at the destruction of his cake, which in fact he never devours. Regret for squandered means, we allow, is often one, among the many other circumstances, which Dr Brown has so happily enumerated, as enhancing and aggravating the force of the avaricious principle, and may sometimes awaken and develope it, when it has slept for a long time. But we cannot believe it to be the mainspring of the passion itself, nor sufficient, especially, to remove the embarrassment, which the author has encountered in the exposition of his theory. Even should the separate desire, on which we insist, be denied, still we would account for most of the workings of avarice on far different principles from this regret. But we forbear to trust ourselves now with the discussion.

Dr Brown has with great felicity assigned several reasons, for the paradox in common life, of a person parting tranquilly with large sums, while the loss of small ones is sufficient to destroy his happiness for a day. He might have accounted for this latter case, in some instances, not so much from merely avaricious feelings, as from the shame of being overreached in a bargaining transaction. To many persons, it is an intolerable thought, that the market man, with whom they are trading, will wink, in half penny triumph, at his brother market man, as soon as their backs are turned. Many, also, contend long for a trifle, from a pure sense of justice.

We come now to the consideration of our author's Ethical System. The Science of Ethics, he observes, has relation to our affections of mind, not simply as phenomena, but as *virtuous* or *vicious*, *right* or *wrong*.

What then is the virtue, which it is the practical object of this science to recommend? Why do we consider certain actions, says Dr Brown, and we could add, certain feelings, as morally right, and others, as morally wrong? The only test, according to him, is a simple emotion of *approbation*, or of *disapprobation*. We are so constituted, that we cannot help approving certain classes of human actions, and disapproving certain other classes. God himself, who gave us a relish for wholesome food, and a distaste for what is injurious, has, for analogous, but far higher purposes, created us subject to such immediate moral feelings.

These emotions, our author contends, are uniform in all men, but occasionally modified by three circumstances. First, the influence of *passion* obliterates for a time, in many minds, the emotions that ought to arise on the contemplation of moral or immoral actions. Secondly, individuals, and even whole nations, have sometimes partial and imperfect views of the true tendencies of certain actions, in which there is a *mixture of good and evil*, and this is the cause why morality appears to fluctuate in different times and places. Thirdly, *association*, in various ways, exerts considerable influence in modifying and perverting the emotions, which would otherwise be naturally raised by particular kinds of actions. The author insists, that these three limitations still leave unimpaired the great fundamental distinctions of morality itself, the *moral approbation* of the producer of unmixed good as good, and the *moral disapprobation* of him who produces unmixed evil for the sake of evil.

He refutes the sophistry and skepticism, which pretend that, in consequence of the foregoing limitations, the science of morality is unsettled, and virtue itself but a precarious and fluctuating name. He maintains, that where one instance can be found of disagreement among men, in approving certain actions and disapproving certain others, there are millions and millions of instances, all over the world, of a perfect uniformity of moral sentiment.

The author next proceeds to examine other theories of morality, which have been broached by different writers. Hobbes, who makes virtue to depend on political enactment; Mandeville, who reduces it to a corrupt love of praise; Clarke and Wollaston, who identify it with the fitness and the truth of things; Hume, who measures it solely by the standard of general utility; the ancient and modern disciples of Aristippus, who resolve it into the pursuit of selfish gratification; Paley, who defines it to be 'the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness;' and Dr Smith, who allows it no other standard, than our sympathy with the feelings of others, are successively subjected to elaborate confutations. In these strictures we see displayed an instinctive acuteness, in seizing the points at issue, and an unrivalled power of argument. The author, of course, throughout the whole speculation, says

many things to justify and illustrate his own system of morality, and mode of treating it. We have a few remarks to suggest.

The great defect of Dr Brown's ethical theory is, that he has confined his attention entirely to *actions*, which are only the occasional signs and representatives of virtue and vice in moral beings. We admire his discovery, as it may well be called, and on which another superior mind of our own country,* by a remarkable coincidence, has lighted, that certain feelings of vivid approval and disapproval are the true and original tests of right and wrong. As the physical qualities of substances can only be properly known, distinguished, and described, by their effects on our senses, and not by vain attempts to ascertain their abstract nature, so the moral qualities of thinking and responsible agents are to be designated by their *effects* on other minds. This, indeed, is an ingenious, a noble principle; it is a bright eyed offspring of the Baconian philosophy; it is the pioneer to satisfactory conclusions on the subject before us; it introduces at once a flood of light into this hitherto perplexed and obscure discussion. But having seized on the mighty instrument itself, Dr Brown seems to have failed in applying it with his usual comprehensive energy. In inquiring what objects, when contemplated by us, excite the approving, or disapproving emotion, he has strangely omitted the consideration of those mental feelings, or rather *states* of mind, which, in the first place, give to actions their entire moral character, and, in the second place, constitute, by themselves, more than nine tenths of the vice and virtue of the world, without even being brought into action. Thus, simple indifference to the welfare of others we disapprove as vice. A mere intention, a wish, is often virtuous or vicious. *Refraining* from action is frequently virtue or vice. Mere purity of mind we regard with the approving glow, which is paid to active virtue. Regret, shame, anger, joy, and other emotions, are regarded as right or wrong, according to the occasions on which they arise. It is not the blush that we admire and approve; but the modesty, of which that meteor like tinge is the enchanting signal. It is not the mere phantasmagorial sight of a man, exposing

* The late Professor Frisbie. See his *Miscellaneous Writings*, edited by Andrews Norton, p. 144, et seqq.

his life to save a drowning enemy, that excites within us the vivid feeling of approbation ; it is the sublime state of his soul at the moment, and which the action itself is only instrumental in making known.

Now, in consequence of not adverting to these essential considerations, Dr Brown has left this part of his ethical discussions in no little imperfection and perplexity. He all along states it as an ultimate law of our constitution, that certain *actions* excite within us the approving or the disapproving feeling, by which we distinguish them as virtuous or vicious. He speaks as if the moral nature of every action was immediately and intuitively known, as right or wrong, in the same manner as a color is immediately recognised as green or yellow. He takes no account of that long and varied thread of experience, observation, acquisition, reflection, deduction, culture, admonition, discipline, and example, by which moral feelings and ideas are developed in the mind of the child, and by which alone it comes at length to form its judgments of the character of moral actions. This, certainly, is a loose handling of the question, a very imperfect analysis of the matter under discussion.

If, therefore, the foregoing reflections are just, the true and amended theory of Dr Brown, the really ultimate law of our moral institutions, for which he sought, would be this.

Certain *emotions, desires, intentions, or states of mind*, in other men, which are made known *sometimes* by actions, sometimes by other sensible signs, and sometimes by verbal information, more or less direct, excite within us the vivid feeling of approbation, or disapprobation, corresponding to which, we are accustomed to denominate those states of mind, and the actions they produce, virtuous or vicious, right or wrong, moral or immoral. We are the more confirmed in this amendment of our author's philosophical views, from its coinciding with the principles of morality inculcated in the Sermon on the Mount.

It is from this point, we humbly think, that all ethical science must properly begin. Its adoption, we are persuaded, would have supplied a palpable defect in the work before us, and saved some readers many an hour of wistful dissatisfaction and perplexity. It is no more correct to confine the question to *actions*, than to the *looks* of the countenance. A tolerably

plausible system of morals might be built on the latter, as well as on the former species of exterior manifestations. Would that theory of dialling be complete or scientific, which confined the inquiry to the shape of the gnomon, and the motions of the shadow alone, while the primary consideration of the sun's movements and rays remained untouched? Our author, in the outset of the discussion, seems to have had a glimpse of the principle we have been urging, but certainly lost sight of it afterwards. He defines the Science of Ethics, as having relation to our *affections of mind*, as virtuous or vicious, right or wrong. Then why not proceed, and erect the science upon this broad and true foundation? Why abandon it almost immediately, and say, 'One inquiry alone is necessary—*what actions excite in us*, when contemplated, *a certain vivid feeling?*' &c. [Edin. Ed. Vol. 4, p. 148. And. Ed. Vol. 3, p. 267.] We trust we have sufficiently shown the very narrow and incomplete relation, which this particular inquiry bears to ethical science as a whole.

In inquiring what constitutes the sense of *moral obligation*, Dr Brown appears to us to be aiming at a theory of too much simplicity. 'To feel,' says he, 'the character of *approvableness*, in an action, which we have not yet performed, and are only meditating on it as *future*, is to feel the *moral obligation*, or moral inducement to perform it.' The late Professor Frisbie seems to have been dissatisfied with this explanation, but in his criticism upon it, has not, we think, exactly approached the difficulty. 'Are there not many actions,' he asks, 'which seem to us to have very little virtue or merit, yet by which the feeling of obligation is very strongly excited; nay, is not the obligation often inversely as the merit, as for example, in regard to the payment of honest debts?''* To these interrogatories we reply, that the obligation, which Professor Frisbie instances, is not properly or entirely a moral obligation. Without being apparently conscious of the facts, he has shifted the very point in question. In regard to the payment of honest debts, there is something more than the sense of moral obligation; there is the sense of *legal* obligation; there is also the dread of offending society, creating enemies, and thus injuring one's general interests.

* Miscellaneous Writings, p. 157.

Let a law be passed exonerating the debtor; let public opinion too coincide with the law. There will then be *merit* in paying the debt, and a merit exactly in proportion to the moral obligation.

In what respects then may it be said, that Dr Brown's theory is deficient? According to our opinion, he has, undesignedly, however inconsistently with himself, suggested the precise and true theory in a subsequent part of his speculations. The following sentence occurs in p. 395, Vol. 4, Edin. Ed. towards the close of Lect. 91. 'When I say, that it is my duty to perform a certain action, I mean nothing more than that if I do not perform it, I shall regard myself, and others will regard me, with moral *disapprobation*.*' Here, we are convinced, he has fallen upon the right key to the nature of moral obligation. It is not enough for us simply to approve an action, in order to feel the whole force of such obligation; the very word obligation implies some conditional *compulsion*, *constraint*, apprehended *penalty* in case of our neglecting the duty. Now, what is the penalty implied in the idea of moral obligation? Surely, as our author suggests above, the *pain*, which all moral beings feel in disapproving themselves, or being disapproved by others. It is this which we dread; it is this which *constrains* us. The moment we allow a fear of any other nature than this to operate upon us, such as a dread of corporal punishment, or bodily pain of any other kind, or an injury to our general interests, the *moral* changes into the character of *physical* obligation.

Dr Brown's distribution of the Duties is the old and obvious one of duties to others, to ourselves, and to God. His treatment of this subject completes the work, and, on the whole, deserves a similar tribute of praise, and similarly modified, with that bestowed on his treatment of the more general subject of the Emotions. Curious speculations are pursued, current errors are refuted, novel and valuable ideas are advanced, magnificent commonplaces are unfurled and waved about, and over the whole is diffused a vivid glow of

* Just to show the author's inconsistency with himself, above alluded to, turn over one leaf of his book, and there will be seen the following sentence. 'It is, as I have said, on the *one simple feeling of moral approvableness*, that every duty, and therefore, every right is founded.' But in the sentence in the text, has he not said that the sense of duty arises from a fear of *disapprobation*?

moral and religious feeling. A few lectures, perhaps, in this portion, require a little bracing up of the attention to read them through ; one needs a perpetual recollection, that one of our principal duties is to read Dr Brown's inculcation of the duties, and frequent repetitions are called for of the internal resolution, *I will go on*. In all probability, these few lectures were written under the influence of the same feeling. Yet somewhat tedious as they are, they will repay a studious perusal. Nor are many of them fairly liable to the foregoing stricture. On the contrary, several will be found to exhibit the author's peculiar vivacity, originality, and other excellencies. Instance the beautiful and ingenious lecture on friendship and gratitude, and one on the goodness of the Deity.

In treating of our duties to God, the author takes occasion to demonstrate the existence and attributes of the Almighty Being. He rightly discards the argument *a priori*, which forever assumes the very point to be proved. He relies altogether on the short, simple, but irresistible argument drawn from the appearances of benevolent design, so profusely scattered over every part of the universe. We are dissatisfied with his attempted demonstration of the unity of God, and never yet have felt the force of the same point of reasoning when urged by other writers. It is founded on the *unity and simplicity of design*, everywhere exhibited in the works of the Creator. Two objections to this argument we cannot conquer. The first is, that it would be not very difficult to make out a case of irreconcilable contrariety and multiplicity of design, apparent in the works of nature. For instance, in one point of view, what tender care seems to be taken of the happiness of all living creatures, while, in many respects, they seem to be left, with utter indifference, to their miserable fate. The second is, that even if a perfect unity of design, without the slightest apparent exception, could be pointed out as prevailing in the universe, it would not absolutely, or satisfactorily prove a unity in the power which produced it. A million of deities might conspire in the most complete uniformity of operations. A stranger to this earth would find a certain uniformity of design, nay, thousands of different operations and results harmoniously conspiring to a single end, amidst all the works of men. But it is unnecessary to say, how illogical would be his conclusion, that one being was the au-

thor of the whole. He might, perhaps, properly infer, that one *genus* of beings had been at work in the construction of similar edifices, canals, cities, and other products of art. The mythology of the Greeks, which peopled every department of creation with presiding deities, was built on such an inference. And this, we are persuaded, is as far as human reason can legitimately advance, in *settling the point* of the simplicity or complexity of the divine nature. It is a matter as far removed from positive, abstract demonstration, as the Deity himself is removed from man. It is true, the idea of the unity of God is now embraced in the world with more or less distinctness and purity; there is nothing in nature to contradict or refute it, since even an actual contrariety of design might be consistent with it; nay, it is almost a self evident truth; philosophy can defend it by most plausible arguments; but philosophy must not, cannot assume the triumph of originally establishing and making it known. Every attempt to that effect which we witness, concurring with our inability to trace it so clearly to any other quarter, only drives us back with increased conviction to the leading representation of the Hebrew Scriptures, that the idea in question was originally and directly communicated from heaven, in some way or other, to men of Asiatic origin.

When Dr Brown comes to consider our duties to ourselves, he takes up the question of the Immortality of the Soul. He advances in the affirmative some arguments that are absolutely gigantic, and others, that appear feeble and untenable. We will give an instance of each kind. Those, who hastily infer the destruction of the mind from the destruction of the body, will find it difficult to evade the force of the following reasoning, which has all the weight and acuteness characteristic of the author.

‘When the body seems to us to perish, we know that it does not truly perish,—that everything which existed in the decaying frame, continues to exist entire, as it existed before; and that the only change which takes place, is a change of *apposition* or *proximity*. From the first moment at which the earth arose, there is not the slightest reason to think that a single atom has perished. All that *was, is*; and if nothing has perished in the material universe;—if, even in that bodily dissolution, which alone gave occasion to the belief of our mortality as sentient beings, there is not the loss of the most inconsiderable particle of the dissolving frame,—the argument

of analogy, far from leading us to suppose the destruction of that spiritual being, which animated the frame, would lead us to conclude that *it*, too, exists, as it before existed; and that it has only changed its relation to the particles of our material organs, as these particles still subsisting have changed the relations, which they mutually bore. As the dust has only returned to the earth from which it came, it is surely a reasonable inference from analogy to suppose, that the spirit may have returned to the God who gave it.' *Lecture 96.*

Nothing was ever better said. But Dr Brown was well aware of an argument, which the obstinate materialist still has in store, namely, that all the mental operations, and consequently, what the immaterialist gratuitously calls the mind itself, may be nothing more than phenomena, resulting from the union and organisation of material particles in a certain manner. Now to this our author offers the following feeble argument.

'If any one were to say, the Sun has no thought, Mercury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and all their secondaries, have no thought; but the Solar System has thought,—we should then scarcely hesitate a moment, in rejecting such a doctrine; because, we should feel instantly that there could be no charm in the two words, solar system, which are of our own invention, to confer on the separate masses of the heavenly bodies, what under a different form of mere verbal expression, they had been declared previously not to possess. What the *sun and planets* have not, the *solar system*, which is nothing more than that sun and planets, has not; or, if so much power be ascribed to the mere invention of a term, as to suppose that we can confer by it new qualities on things, there is a realism in philosophy, far more monstrous than any which prevailed in the Logic of the Schools.

If, then, the *solar system* cannot have properties, which the sun and planets have not, and if this be equally true, at whatever distance, near or remote, they may exist in space, it is surely equally evident, that an organ, which is only a name for a number of separate corpuscles, as the solar system is only a number of larger masses of corpuscles,—cannot have any properties, which are not possessed by the corpuscles themselves, at the very moment at which the organ as a whole, is said to possess them,—nor any affections as a whole, additional to the affections of the separate parts. An organ is nothing; the corpuscles, to which we give that single name, are all,—and if a sensation be an organic state, it is a state of many corpuscles, which have no more unity than the greater number of particles in the multitudes of brains, which form the sensations of all mankind.' *Lecture 98.*

This reasoning will never do. To show its absurdity, let us follow it up for a moment in its own style. 'If any one were to say, the Sun has no' mutual attraction, 'Mercury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and all their secondaries,' when separate and alone, have no mutual attraction, 'but the solar system has' mutual attraction, 'we should then scarcely hesitate a moment in rejecting such a doctrine.' Thus, by our author's course of argument, we could disprove one of the most obvious facts of natural philosophy. So, again, what an acid has not, when alone, and an alkali, when alone, has not, the combination of acids and alkalies never can have ; and, therefore, such a phenomenon as *effervescence* between acids and alkalies, according to our author, can never take place. The truth is, Dr Brown is here guilty of begging the question. The very argument of the materialist is, that *although* the particles of matter, when separate, are not able to think, yet, when brought together in a certain way, which the Deity may appoint, the result of their *influence on each other* may be the phenomenon, which we express by the word thought. This our author denies, maintaining, that what one particle cannot perform in a separate state, a multitude of particles cannot perform in any sort of combination. It is plain, however, that this is no answer, but only a flat denial of the materialist's argument, and, moreover, involves some most careless general positions, which are immediately disproved by an appeal to ordinary experience.

Before quitting this topic, we would just ask the author, why so strenuous in maintaining the immateriality of the soul, when, in his noble argument, quoted above, he assumes the imperishableness of matter ?

On the whole, we cannot claim for him the merit of having placed the immortality of the soul on new and stronger vantage ground, than it occupied before. His reasonings on the subject appear to us to be full of assumptions. As might be expected, the discussion leads him too far from the track of pure philosophy into the entanglements of metaphysics. In defending the unity and indivisibility of the thinking principle, qualities which he regards as essential to its immortality, but which we do not, he is betrayed into arguments quite inconsistent with other statements in different parts of his work. For instance, he vigorously maintains that the mind can exist

only in a single state at once. But according to his whole philosophy elsewhere, and even according to the most common experience, that very mind is capable of existing in an intellectual state, and in an emotion, simultaneously; and it may be remembered, that in explaining the soul's personal identity, he allowed, that along with the *memory* of a sensation or an idea, we have an *intuitive belief*, that we are the same individuals, who had the sensation or idea before.* One would suppose, that in these cases there are two states, in which the mind exists at the same moment. But our author endeavors to surmount the inconsistency, by denominating them *one complex state*. Now, we confess ourselves quite as unable to conceive, how a unique single principle can exist, in what the author calls a complex state, as how it can exist in two different states at once. If the latter be incompatible with its nature, why is not the former also? Truth is, the phrase, 'complex state,' or the still more impalpable and metaphysical phrase, which is sometimes a favorite one with the author, namely, 'a state of virtual comprehensiveness,' is but a wordy covering for a most unconquerable difficulty, and leaves the real nature of the mind in as much obscurity as ever. Amidst all his horror for rash hypothesis and gratuitous assumption, we are astonished at finding him everywhere asserting, as if it were an axiom of Euclid, that 'the mind is not composed of parts that coexist, but is simple and *indivisible*.' Now this is unwarrantable. According to the true spirit of the new philosophy, we have nothing to do with this question. Much can be said plausibly in favor of the compound nature of the mind, without furnishing any fair triumph to skepticism, or exciting any necessary alarm among modest philosophers.

Indeed, we have no hopes of gaining higher assurances of the soul's immortality, from any new speculations on its internal structure. Be it simple, or be it compound, we do not despair. We doubt whether all the philosophy in the world can either improve, or set aside, the lucid and truly Baconian argument of the Apostle to the Gentiles, founded on the analogy between the germination of a perishing seed, and the revivification of the human soul. The story left us by the Gallilean fishermen, which we are not ashamed to avow is far easier for us to believe than to doubt, needs no support from the

* North American Review, No. 44, p. 13.

visions either of a Plato or a Priestley; and while we look down into the vacant tomb, that once belonged to Joseph of Arimathea, we are little swayed, either one way or another, by the ingenuity and strength, or by the feebleness and inconclusiveness, exhibited in the reasonings even of Dr Brown.

Our abstract terminates here. As an abstract, it is exceedingly imperfect, and conveys a very faint idea of the work. We have rather dwelt upon those topics, which seemed to require critical remark, than attempted to give a systematic sketch of all the author's achievements. We shall now fulfil our promise to exact, from various quarters, a few contributions to the illustration of our author's character and writings. The following notice is from a volume of the *Edinburgh Magazine*, for the year 1820.

‘Dr Brown’s character was one of extreme, and I might almost say, of fastidious refinement. The habits of speculative philosophy and abstract thought, had not destroyed the vivacity of his imagination, or chilled the warmth of his heart. He was by nature an enthusiast, and the prominent features of his mind in early youth were sensibility and ardor. At school he was distinguished by extreme gaiety and sweetness of disposition, and his contemporaries remembered how much he delighted and excelled in the recitation of dramatic poetry. Soon after he engaged in philosophical studies, he distinguished himself for acuteness of reasoning; and his answer to Darwin’s *Zoonomia* demonstrated the discriminating powers of his mind. It is not for the writer of this letter to presume to analyse the subtlety, and profound originality, of his metaphysical inquiries. Among those who attended his lectures, some complained of a certain vagueness and refinement that bordered on obscurity, but when he entered on the moral part of his course, he excited the highest degree of enthusiasm for all that was elevated and noble in human nature. It was then he gave full scope to the lofty conceptions of his mind, and displayed an energy and devotion in the cause of moral truth that could not be surpassed, and can never be forgotten.

‘Dr Brown’s manners might be considered somewhat artificial, and yet no man had more simplicity and singleness of heart, if that term belongs to one uninfluenced in his opinions, tastes, inclinations, and habits, by the caprices of fashion, or the calculations of a worldly mind. He never sought the society of the fashionable, the rich, or the high born, on account of any of these adventitious circumstances. He carried the independent purity of his political principles into the morals of private life. His habits were abstemious, simple, and self-denied. His liberality to those, who needed

his pecuniary assistance, was as frank as it was unostentatious. But his benevolence was not of a kind to content itself with the cheap indulgence of almsgiving. Long after he had given up medical practice, he gave his time and attention to the sick friends, who required his advice ; and what Burke said of Howard in a sense restricted to the particular objects of his attention, might be said of Dr Brown universally ; "He attended to the neglected, and remembered the forgotten." There are many persons, wholly unknown to the circles of fashionable life, who received constant proofs of his cheering and kind attention. One instance of this is so characteristic of his turn of mind, that I cannot omit mentioning it. Two Ayrshire peasants, who had made considerable progress in languages as well as in botanical and mathematical science, were recommended to his notice. After presenting them with gratis tickets for his lectures, he invited them to breakfast ; the conversation turned on botanical drawing. One of them proposed to show the Doctor some specimens of his performance in that art. "I was pleased," said he, on relating this circumstance, "to see the progress I had made in the confidence of these young men during the hour of breakfast. They first came to my low door, but when they returned with the drawings, they rang at the front door. I had inspired them with the feeling of equality."

'The political principles of this excellent man were those of genuine Whiggism, untainted with the asperity of party prejudice. His reprobation of tyranny and oppression, wherever it was exercised, will be remembered by those who have heard him express his satisfaction at the overthrow of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose despotism he execrated. He took a deep interest in the political events of his own country. The five restrictive bills, passed during the winter session of 1819, excited his warmest indignation ; and in a meeting held by the *Senatus Academicus*, on the occasion of condoling with and congratulating his present Majesty, he expressed his opinion of those measures very strongly. The most minute circumstances, favorable to civil and religious liberty, interested him to the last ; and as an affecting instance of the sincerity of his feelings, on subjects connected with the freedom of his country, I may mention, that during his last illness, he daily inquired into the state of the Middlesex poll, an event, deeply interesting on a moral as well as political principle, as being the grateful effort of a generous people to reward the son for the virtues of the father ; and when he was told two days before he died, that it had closed in favor of young Whitbread, though unable to speak, his countenance and manner expressed the liveliest satisfaction.

He had returned in the autumn of 1819 to Edinburgh, in remarkably good health, and engaged with much ardor in the composition of his class book. He had even sketched out great literary

designs for his future execution, but that fatal disorder, which terminated in pulmonary consumption, seized him during the Christmas recess. He only lectured twice after the vacation. During the last lecture he delivered, he was greatly affected when he read some lines on the return of spring from Beattie's Hermit. He wished to persevere in his course. But his affectionate friend and physician, Dr Gregory, forbade it, and strongly recommended him to try the effects of a warmer climate. His reply was,—“No, I must die at home, you have no idea how miserably I am afflicted with the *Maladie du pays*.” His decline was rapid and alarming. As long as he had strength to hold a pen, he continued to give unremitting labor to the writing of his class book. In February 1820, he received a short visit from his revered friend Mr Dugald Stewart, though at that time he scarcely admitted any one but his medical friend, and the members of his own family. On taking leave of Mr Stewart, he said gaily but emphatically, “I hope Moral Philosophy will live long in *you*.”

In addition to the above gratifying sketch, an American correspondent has obligingly furnished us with the following interesting particulars, which the numerous admirers of Dr Brown in this country will receive much pleasure in perusing.

‘In compliance with your request, I send you the following very general statements. With Dr Brown I was personally acquainted, and occasionally spent an evening at his house. I experienced much of his hospitality during my stay in that country. Immediately upon my arrival at the city of Edinburgh, after the opening of the session of the University, I called upon Dr Brown, and procured a ticket of admission to his class. Interpreting the intent of your request in the sense in which I believe you designed me to do, I have been led to adopt the following simple plan. *The personal appearance* of Dr Brown seems first to draw my attention. His was in a very especial degree that of an intense student. He was of ordinary stature; of a pale and wan physiognomy; careless and inattentive in his dress. The characteristic of his countenance was highly attractive, and none could meet him in the streets without noticing it in a particular manner. Profound thought was engraven on every feature. There appeared to be a great mind at work within, and absorbed in the most abstruse speculations. The outward aspect of Dr Brown evinced to the observing mind, that his trains of thought were those of a higher order. Next, as to *the mode which he*

adopted in delivering his lectures. In the class room he appeared in the most advantageous points of view. His manner was grave and dignified. He commanded profound silence, marked attention, and a high expression of regard. He read, or with more propriety I should say, he recited his lectures in an animated strain. He appeared himself to feel the importance of those intellectual views, which he had created and was delivering, and was solicitous that the value of them should be perceived and appreciated by those who heard them. He read the poetical quotations, occasionally introduced, in a distinct and impressive manner. I was accustomed to hail with delight the returning toll, which summoned us to lecture, and regarded it as a philosophical treat. Dr Brown did not permit his students to take notes during the time of lecturing, owing to a fact with which you are doubtless familiar, viz. that a few years preceding, some of the lectures of Mr Stewart were presented to the public in a garbled form, before the author himself had issued them. Dr Brown was desirous that his students should, at the close of the lecture, apply to him for the solution of those doubts of a metaphysical kind that might arise. With such he would freely converse.

‘He was intensely *studious*. Although surrounded by such a host of social attractions as Edinburgh presents, he allowed not his studious habits to be violated. I heard him state, that he set apart two evenings during every week, either for the reception of his company, or for his own personal relaxation. The rest of his time he considered as sacred to study. The *manners* of Dr Brown were interesting and rather refined. He was full of conversation; very vivacious, and remarkable for the versatility of his information and diction. He could instantly enter upon any topic, however remote, and in his usual happy strain. In *private life* he was truly amiable. Two sisters lived with him, whom he supported. The most marked affection appeared to exist between them. He was devoted to the gratification of their slightest wishes. His feelings as a man were generous and noble. He possessed more than an ordinary share of sensibility, and would indulge, in the hour of conversation, in the most sympathetic strain, on any scene of distress, which he had either witnessed, or of which he had heard.’

We have delayed for six months the publication of the present article, in the hope of receiving from Edinburgh an

essay on the life and genius of Dr Brown, by the Rev. Mr Welsh, announced as preparing for the press some time last year. But as yet, it has not been issued, and the distance of time is already too great, between our former and present articles on the lectures, to allow of any farther delay. A glimpse into Dr Brown's lecture room, as most of our readers will remember, is furnished in the impudent, but entertaining 'Letters of Peter to his Kinsfolk.'

Having collected and presented the foregoing testimonials of the peculiarities of our author's genius, and some notices of his life, a few desultory remarks on the former subject, and on the work before us, must be all that we now feel either inclined or justified to attempt.

The prominent capacity, in which Dr Brown offers himself to our minds, is that of a fearless, minute, and ultimate *analyst*. This is the characteristic, that distinguishes him from every other author on record. We are not disposed to vindicate his absolute superiority in many other striking qualifications. His style is far from being faultless, his scholarship is neither exquisite in choice, nor extensive in its range, nor are his observations on life and manners peculiarly rich or original; though in all these, as well as in many similar valuable requisites for a public instructor, he is not only not deficient, but is much more than respectable. But, in the art of looking into the elements and finer relations of things, in detecting the action and reaction between mind and matter, in reducing all human knowledge to its first principles, we boldly pronounce him to be without a competitor in our language. The true focus of Dr Brown's mind, the mark at which its most intense power acted, was fixed by nature for *microscopic* inspection. His more comprehensive surveys and larger classifications, though often imposing and magnificent, are sometimes dim, unwieldy, and incomplete. Witness his original arrangement of Politics and *Political Economy*, among the peculiar branches of the Philosophy of the Mind, an arrangement, however, which he did not subsequently follow. For another instance to the same purpose, we refer to his Inquiry into Cause and Effect, which wants distinctness in its general management and outline, though all the separate details of the argument are conducted with wonderful acuteness and power. Nor, while we follow him along the track of his curious speculations, or

peruse his more splendid and ambitious compositions, do we almost ever meet with those happy generalisations of expression, which so frequently astonish and delight us in the French school of the last century. Indeed, if a generalisation of this kind had struck him, he would not have been content to state and leave it simply to his reader. He would have indulged his favorite habit of tracing out all the particulars that went to form it, thus appearing to arrive by gradual steps to a conclusion, on which Voltaire or Diderot would have alighted at once.

But they, on the other hand, displayed little of his peculiar faculty and strength. Whoever will gaze through the medium of Dr Brown's representations at the objects of his analysis, will perceive them clothed with unwonted brilliancy and distinctness, and new points of vision starting up, which were unsuspected before. All nature crumbles into infinitesimals before his glance. No man is a warmer adorer of the aggregate beauty and glory of the universe, but no man was ever so prone to regard it as a world of *atoms*. So too, while he is an impassioned admirer of roses and beautiful faces, he cannot avoid reducing them, by a kind of stereographic projection, into plain surfaces of colored rays. He gazes with a poet's delight on the splendid embroidery, which nature hangs around us, but traces the involutions of every thread with still more of the eagerness of a metaphysician. He has erected new landmarks between the regions of illusion and those of reality. He has dissolved much of the influence, which names still exerted on our ideas of things. The study of his writings produces on the mind a similar effect with the study of chemistry.

We look round upon creation with almost newly furnished optics ; every incident suggests matter of philosophical speculation ; the motions of an infant, and the actions of an adult, 'all thoughts, all passions, all delights,' assume unaccustomed aspects, and exhibit interesting relations in the varied system of things. It is worthy of remark, that at the same moments, when Davy was accomplishing some of his greatest achievements in the analysis of matter, Brown was arriving at some of his most brilliant results in the analysis of mind. Both natural and intellectual science seem to have attained a point

of equal progress, when these two contemporaries arose, to push further analogous discoveries respectively in each.

The next most remarkable characteristic, that distinguishes our author, is the undisguised warmth of his moral sentiments. It is rather out of fashion, with existing literature, to seem very much in love with virtue. The phantom reproach of cant lowers in the distance, and frightens the moraliser into a well dissembled indifference. The public is a kind of good company, whose feelings must not be hurt by declamations against its favorite peccadilloes. The whining sentimentality of some authors, which was carried to a disgusting extreme about the end of the last century, and which received its death blow from Sheridan's character of Joseph Surface, underwent the usual reaction of other human extravagancies, and writers and talkers are now almost ashamed to testify any enthusiasm in favor of the parlor, every day virtues. Rousseau's delightful declamations, too, were mingled with so much that was unprincipled and false, that they contributed not a little to the same effect. Dr Brown has been one of the first to break this chill spell of assumed apathy. He comes forward, without fearing the charge of mawkishness or of hypocrisy, and pours out his whole soul in ardent praise of whatever is good and lovely. He appears as the unshrinking advocate, especially, of all the domestic and gentler virtues. The seriousness of his enthusiasm is well calculated to put to flight the skeptical and profligate smile of the scoffer. His works, in this respect, might be recommended as an antidote to the poison of Byron. Unlike most moral philosophers, he treats not of the virtues and of our moral feelings, with the same cold and scientific interest, that he would inquire into the affinities of a salt or a mineral. His inmost sympathies keep pace with his subject, and impart light to it. Several indirect testimonials to the truth and inspiration of Christianity, are scattered throughout his Lectures. He is thus shielded from the charge, so often urged against the productions of his illustrious predecessor. But we wish that he were more than so shielded, and that Christianity had been more directly, explicitly, and formally introduced into his moral system. We lament the miserable mistake, into which so many moral philosophers have been betrayed, in declining any assistance from the New Testament. How might Dr Brown have

added light, sanctity, and authority to his own doctrines, while he in turn would have contributed no small support to the cause of Christianity. Can it be doubted, that Dr Chalmers is at this moment supplying the defect, on which we have been animadverting? May his attempts be wise and successful.

We have next a few words to say respecting our author's style. We remember hearing reported a happy *jeu d'esprit* on this subject, from the admired writer of *Letters from the Mountains*. When asked how she was pleased with Dr Brown's poetry, she replied, that it had too much metaphysics for her, and when immediately again questioned how she liked his metaphysics, she pronounced it too full of poetry. There is at least some foundation for this smart antithesis, though not enough to raise a serious objection against the writings in question. Dr Brown published several volumes of poetry at different times, but, in our opinion, scarcely a line of them was sufficiently metaphysical or respectable to deserve reading over, with the single exception of the *Paradise of Coquettes*. This work, published anonymously, was immediately, by the unanimous consent of the critics, pronounced to be second of its kind only to the *Rape of the Lock*. There is metaphysics in it, but we cannot think it *too* metaphysical. That portion of it, particularly entitled to this epithet, is one of the most sublime, beautiful, ingenious, and original efforts of the English muse. It is a description of the Heaven of Coquettes, and we have always regretted, that so very lofty a flight of the imagination should have been introduced into a work of a design so gay and humorous. It is difficult to read it without feeling religiously, rather than facetiously disposed. It somewhat resembles an inspired glimpse into the possibilities of a future state of being, and, with due modifications, would have been much more worthy of occupying a place in Baxter's *Saint's Everlasting Rest*, that gorgeous and delicious poem in prose, than of serving as a rhapsody in some heroi-comic effusion.

With respect to the other point of the abovementioned antithesis, we allow it to be better founded. There is a little too much poetry in Dr Brown's metaphysics, or, more exactly speaking, his general style as a writer is over poetical and ornamental. We are very far from recommending it as a

a model, and should be sorry to see it adopted as such, with the same facility, that our young men copied the less ambitious, but still somewhat too measured flow of Mr Stewart's periods. We have sometimes thought that having written his Lectures, when comparatively young, and adopted at that time a florid and towering manner, Dr Brown was afterwards the less likely to correct it, in consequence of retaining, repeating, and laboring upon, the same course from year to year. He often indulges in solemn parade and emphatic preambles, while approaching the discussion of his topics, and talks much of the difficulty of his tasks. We know of no better way to characterise his style, than to denominate it ultra-Ciceronian. Coming short of the perfections attained, on the one hand, by the Roman orator, it leans, on the other, rather towards his faults. It is too elaborate, tumid, and redundant. It is like Akenside's verse turned into prose, except that it sends out not the slightest of a Grecian savor, and this last circumstance, coupled with the rarity, amounting almost to absence, of quotations from the Greek, convinces us, that the author must have been very superficially versed in the literature of that language. It may seem a hard and rash judgment to estimate a person's scholarship, from the number of his learned quotations; and so in general it is. But when one is a professed, and as we may say, an inveterate quoter, filling his productions with extracts from English and Latin authors, we may fairly conclude, that a line or two from Euripides, and a sentence now and then from Plato, if they had been 'familiar to his ear as household words,' would have embellished his moral declamations, or given point to some of his philosophical statements and conclusions.

Notwithstanding these negative peculiarities, it must not, however, be denied, that our Lecturer deserves to be ranked among the classical writers of the language. He is wanting only in a kind of Augustan perfection; yet still he is classical, in the same way as that epithet belongs to Ammianus, to Statius, and to Seneca. The last author, by the way, is a god of his idolatry, and is quoted by him, we remember, alone of all others, five times in one Lecture. No man ever wielded the resources of the English tongue more skilfully than Dr Brown, or wrote it in more perfect purity. Yet it was the general European standard of its perfection, at which

he aimed, and not at its idiomatical properties and graces. His style has all the effort and completeness of a well executed movement by some scientific composer, but little of the indescribable and native charm, that pervades the beautiful melodies of his own country. He is full of brilliancies, while he has few felicities, and it is this defect, which will lose for him the greatest number of readers. There are no easy, sweet, and playful turns in his diction, to relieve the strained and everlasting *nisus* of scientific disquisition. He *hammers* everything to the last degree. There is not a thought shown us just as it came into his mind. Though we admire the productions of his skill, yet we almost hear the workman panting and striving at his labor, and the whole atmosphere of his book is redolent of oil.

A favorite figure of speech with the author, which he very frequently carries to a fault, is the climax. Scarcely a lecture that does not contain one. To set off some leading idea, or to give force and splendor to an illustration, circumstance is heaped upon circumstance, and clause mounts over clause, till the breath of the stoutest reader gives way, and the dizzy train of his thoughts often goes with it.

We must acknowledge that, in the writings of Dr Brown, there are too many obscure and difficult passages. After making due allowance for the imperfect state in which his manuscripts may have been left,* for the abstruse and shadowy nature of many of his topics, and even for an occa-

* We take the liberty of mentioning here a confused and erroneous arrangement of a few of the Lectures, at the end of the first, and beginning of the second volumes of the Edinburgh edition, and in the latter portion of the first volume of the Andover. To any one who will examine the matter with ordinary attention, there will, as we think, appear so many undeniable reasons for a substitution of the following arrangement, that we shall not take the trouble to enumerate them. It is certain that, as the Lectures now stand, nothing can be more perplexed and ill concatenated. To introduce order among them, we recommend these six movements.

1. Lecture 24, as now numbered, should unquestionably be Lecture 23.

2. But the *recapitulation* prefixed to Lecture 23, as it now stands, including pp. 511, 512, Edinburgh edition, or p. 345, Andover edition, should remain as it is. Then the body of the true Lecture 23, will properly begin near the bottom of p. 537 Edinburgh, or on p. 362 Andover. *That we now seem to perceive*, &c. This, if we are correct, should be continued to p. 563, Edinburgh, or p. 376 Andover, where Lecture 23 will properly end.

3. The recapitulation prefixed to Lecture 24, stands where it ought, ending near the close of p. 537 Edinburgh, or on p. 362 Andover, thus ;—*boundaries from the other*. The body of the true Lecture 24, will begin at p. 513 Edinburgh, or p. 346 Andover, thus ;—*Though the notion of extension*, &c. and

sional mysticism and unattainable aim in some of his thoughts, there still remain too many sentences to remind us, by contrast, of the unabating transparency of Mr Stewart's elocution. On the whole, we must allow, that our author's is often a hard style to read, and, as we should have thought, a much harder one to hear. He seems frequently not to have adapted his sentences to the capacity of the ear. The attention is stormed and borne along, rather by the force and brilliancy of the expressions, by the earnest energy of the writer, and by the novelty, splendor, and importance, of his well selected topics, than by the clearness and distinctness of each successive position, and a certain smooth and resistless current of diction, of which Adam Smith, Paley, and Godwin in his philosophical works, occur to us just now as three of the most remarkable instances. It would be unfair, of course, to refer for this point of comparison to historical or narrative writing.

Though it is impossible to deny Dr Brown the possession of very extensive attainments in polite literature, yet sometimes there occur passages, which seem to indicate a want of familiarity with subjects, that are at the fingers' ends of every general reader.

In one place he condescends to impart, with much display, the information, that Abelard, besides his well known connexion with Eloisa, 'was distinguished for his talents and attainments of every sort ;' and somewhere else he tells us, as a perfect novelty, the whole story of the sympathetic needles from Strada's *Prolusions*. Mr Stewart touches upon such things in quite a different manner.

The remarks hitherto made, apply to the general characteristics of Dr Brown as a writer. We have a few more

continue to the end of p. 530 Edinburgh, or p. 357 Andover, where the true Lecture 23 terminates.

We know no way of accounting for the disorder here pointed out, except by supposing that Dr Brown wrote his recapitulations on separate sheets of paper from the bodies of his Lectures, and thus, that the bodies of Lecture 23 and Lecture 24, have accidentally changed places, while the recapitulations continued in their proper order.

4. The whole of Lecture 27, recapitulation and all, should take the place and number of Lecture 25.

5. Lecture 25, recapitulation and all, should take the rank and place of Lecture 26.

6. Lecture 26, in like manner, should entirely assume the place and rank of Lecture 27. A slight inspection will demonstrate the correctness of these last alterations.

specific criticisms to offer on the particular Lectures before us. Their posthumous publication is a warrant for gentle treatment, of which, however, they little stand in need. It is enough to secure Dr Brown the highest praise to say, that he has well discharged the vast responsibility of being the successor of Mr Stewart, or rather, of taking up the Philosophy of the Mind, where Reid and Stewart had left it. He enjoyed, indeed, peculiar advantages in coming after such men, and inheriting a certain general excitement and respect toward the science, to which they had been instrumental in raising the public mind. The era in which he wrote, too, was one of peculiar intellectual development. Poetry, and every branch of natural science, were daily accomplishing wonders, and our author's condition was precisely such, that he must either produce corresponding achievements in the Philosophy of Mind, or encounter the mortification of failure and obscurity. To these *arduous* advantages he was equal. Certain it is, that during his life he sustained the highest reputation as a Lecturer, and that on every individual, who witnessed his performances, without, as far as we are aware, a single exception, he made a favorable impression, unusually profound and permanent.

A very valuable, if not the most valuable feature of this great work, consists in the contributions which it furnishes to the science of Natural Theology. Paley had already collected from every part of external, material nature, the most striking proofs of benevolent design in the Deity. Brown has effected precisely the same object, with respect to the various phenomena of our intellectual frames. A volume might, with great ease, be extracted from different portions of these lectures, which would completely fill up the chasm in Paley's outline, and deserve a place in every library on the same shelf with his celebrated treatise. Its plan might be consistently extended and improved, by the addition of such extracts as most directly contribute to the cause of religion, morality, and right thinking. One recommendation, at least, of the proposed work would be, that it would present a body of the most clear, original, popular, and least exceptionable passages, that occur throughout the Lectures. Its tendency to higher utility can as little be doubted.

The general plan of the Lectures is, perhaps, too unwieldy and encyclopedial for a single work. We have no right to complain, indeed, of any author, for giving to the public ever so extended a series of delightful and improving compositions. The statutes of his professorship might, also, have enjoined upon this writer a very comprehensive range of subjects, more or less connected with the mind. His original scheme, as we have before seen, included Politics and *Political Economy*. Why it might not also have embraced Languages, Rhetoric, and Grammar, with equal propriety, we cannot divine. We are of opinion that the proper Science of the Mind, if treated with the requisite compactness, would be limited to the investigation and description of our mental operations alone. Legitimately it cannot branch out into Moral Philosophy, nor into Natural Theology. Each of these should form a system by itself. The philosopher of the mind ought, indeed, to trace the *connexions*, which his subject bears with these and all other sciences. But he has no particular business with erecting *systems* of Moral, Theological, Political, or Historical Philosophy. For instance, he may, with Dr Brown, attempt to investigate the true nature of Moral Obligation. This is a sentiment of the mind. But as a mental philosopher, his task stops there. He departs from his particular sphere, when he proceeds to enumerate and enforce the personal, social, political, and religious duties, *arising out* of our moral obligation, since he thus encroaches on the real domain of the Moral Philosopher.

Among the inconveniences, to which the form of posthumous Lectures subjects this work, are the innumerable recapitulations and repetitions, which everywhere occur. Probably all the leading ideas and arguments are stated, to a greater or less extent, three times over; and many of them, even more. So that, were the Lectures reduced to a regular treatise, and these repetitions omitted, we should have a book exceeding in size little more than two thirds of the present. It should be remembered, however, that what is thus sometimes an annoyance in perusal, must have been attended with some advantages to those, who originally had the privilege of hearing. And even now, the reader will find much assistance in comprehending and appreciating the

author's arguments, by studying the recapitulations, in which former statements are frequently placed in better points of view, and considerations altogether new, are sometimes presented. Nor on the whole do we regret, that the identical Lectures themselves have been published as they were delivered, with all those little incidental appeals to the honor and good feelings of the students, those occasional compliments to the author's colleagues in office, and those other allusions to circumstances of time and place, which take much from the abstract nature of the work, and invest it somewhat with the charm of local reality.

Although, as we before intimated, our author's style is the very opposite to the sententious, yet the vastness of his philosophy, and acuteness of his mind, have caused him to scatter several weighty maxims throughout these Lectures. We subjoin a few as morsels for reflection.

'Science is the classification of relations.'

'The form of bodies is their relation to each other in space,—the power of bodies is their relation to each other in time.'

'The power of God is not anything different from God.'

'The philosophy of the mind, and the philosophy of matter, agree, in this respect, that our knowledge is, in both, confined to the mere phenomena.'

'We pay truth a very easy homage, when we content ourselves with despising her adversaries.'

'The difficulty of ascertaining precisely, whether it be truth, which we have attained, is in many cases much greater, than the difficulty of the actual attainment.'

'Philosophy is not the mere *passive possession* of knowledge; it is, in a much more important respect, the *active exercise of acquiring it*.'

'Happiness, though necessarily involving present pleasure, is the direct or indirect, and often the very distant result of feelings of every kind, pleasurable, painful, and indifferent.'

'When absolute discovery is not allowed, there is left a probability of conjecture, of which even philosophy may justly avail herself, without departing from her legitimate province.'

'To know the mind well, is to know its weaknesses as well as its powers.'

'There is always in man a redundant facility of mistake, beyond our most liberal allowance.'

'All the sequences of phenomena are mysterious, or *none* are so.'

'National ridicule is always unjust in degree.'

‘If we had been incapable of considering more than two events together, we probably never should have invented the word *time*.’

‘That men should not agree in opinion, is a part of the very laws of intellect, on which the simplest phenomena of thought depend.’

‘Objects, and the relations of objects—these are all which reasoning involves.’

Three or four lectures are occupied in giving the substance of the author’s doctrine of Cause and Effect. It is an objection to the doctrine, when urged in his broad and unqualified manner, that it must tend to the discouragement of scientific inquiry. In pressing his particular views, he unguardedly represents it as a fruitless task to search for any other cause of a given effect, than the obvious and apparent one. But this would keep us back in the ignorance of infancy. The author could not have intended such a conclusion; but he should have provided better against it. Another thing that has struck us, in our perusal of these arguments, is, that they do not come much short of asserting, that the Deity himself cannot know why a particular cause produces its *immediate* effect. One more remark connected with this topic. When Dr Brown asserts, that nothing can exist in nature, but all the *substances* that exist in nature, what would he say of *motion*? Is this nothing, or is it something? If it is something, can it be called a substance? In short, the existence of motion, particularly spontaneous motion, though more intimately connected than any other phenomenon with this subject, and perhaps involving its essential difficulty, receives not in these speculations its due share of notice.

The author loses himself in a criticism on Hume, at the end of the thirtyfourth Lecture. Hume does not speak of the annihilation of an idea, as Dr Brown represents him, but of the idea of annihilation. This mistake destroys the whole reasoning.

We were disappointed in seeing no attempts to draw the characteristic lines of distinction, between man and the brute creation. The subject is nowhere hinted at. It was admirably adapted to the peculiar powers of the author. He does not even encounter the obvious objection, that most of his arguments for the immortality of the soul would as well apply to ‘faithful Tray,’ as to his master.

We are not satisfied with the liberties everywhere taken, in quoting the English poets. Scarcely a passage from them occurs, that is not altered, apparently with a direct intention, though, we are not always fortunate enough to perceive, with a happier adaptation to the subject in hand.

From the author's ambition to say something of every subject, more or less connected with his particular science, we were surprised that he has interwoven no remarks upon Delirium, Hypochondriasis, Liberty and Necessity, and a few others. An evident vein of Necessitarianism runs through all his speculations. That doctrine may be pretty directly deduced from his views of Cause and Effect, as well as from his favorite statements of the operations of the mind. Amid his loftiest declamations, upon the immortality and other attributes of the soul, we never hear a word of its freedom, although such a topic would have thrown a characteristic lustre on many a splendid paragraph.

Perhaps it may be wrong to assert, that the author was under obligations to the late Dr Cogan, as that gentleman's name, unaccountably at any rate, is alluded to nowhere in the Lectures. Yet it cannot be denied, that a strong general coincidence exists between the two writers in their treatment of the Passions and Emotions, and several ethical questions, and particularly, the *final causes* of the actual arrangement of many mental phenomena.

Dr Brown, more frequently than any other writer, goes back to infancy, childhood, and savage life, for the decision of philosophical points.

He seems to have possessed little sense of the ludicrous. He never undertakes of himself to combat an error with satire. When he has need of this weapon, he constantly resorts to large quotations from Martinus Scriblerus, or Fontenelle. There is in this respect a striking contrast between himself and Dr Campbell, whose ridicule was as irresistible as his serious argument.

We were going on to particularise our favorite Lectures, and to transcribe abundance of other pencil marks, with which we have cumbered the margins of the author's pages, but there is no end to this kind of critical chitchat, and we forbear.
